Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide

Dubra, Juan and Caffera, Marcelo and Figueroa, Nicolás (2016): Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide.

Abstract

It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Mechanism Design; Truth Telling
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q50 - General

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