Nash equilibrium with discontinuous utility functions: Reny's approach extended

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2016): Nash equilibrium with discontinuous utility functions: Reny's approach extended.

Abstract

Philip Reny's approach to games with discontinuous utility functions can work outside its original context. The existence of Nash equilibrium, as well as the possibility to approach an equilibrium with a finite individual improvement path, are established, under a condition slightly weaker than the better reply security, for three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic complementarities, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: better reply security; Nash equilibrium; potential game; game with strategic complementarities; aggregative game
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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