An auction mechanism for public goods provision: an experimental study

Hichri, Pavel and Hichri, Walid (2008): An auction mechanism for public goods provision: an experimental study.

Abstract

We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individuals can contribute several times; at any moment they can see the total amount collected; at the end of the period, the public good is provided if the amount covers the cost. We find that the ability of the mechanism to provide efficiently the public good decreases with the amount of the provision cost.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Public Goods, Experiments, Mechanism Design
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods

References

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