License fees in oligopoly when outside innovator can enter the market: two-step auction

Hattori, Masahiko and Tanaka, Yasuhito (2017): License fees in oligopoly when outside innovator can enter the market: two-step auction.

Abstract

When an outside innovating firm has a cost-reducing technology, it can sell licenses of its technology to incumbent firms, or enter the market and at the same time sell licenses, or enter the market without license. We examine the definitions of license fees in such situations under oligopoly with three firms, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent firms, considering threat by entry of the innovating firm using a two-step auction.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: license; entry; oligopoly; innovating firm; two-step auction
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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