Adversarial scheduling analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion.

Istrate, Gabriel and Marathe, Madhav V. and Ravi, S.S. (2008): Adversarial scheduling analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion. Forthcoming in: Proceedings of the Fourth Computability in Europe (CIE'2008) Conference No. Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 5028 (to appear) (2008): pp. 1-15.

Abstract

In (Istrate et al. SODA 2001) we advocated the investigation of robustness of results in the theory of learning in games under adversarial scheduling models. We provide evidence that such an analysis is feasible and can lead to nontrivial results by investigating, in an adversarial scheduling setting, Peyton Young's model of diffusion of norms . In particular, our main result incorporates contagion into Peyton Young's model.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: evolutionary games, stochastic stability, adversarial scheduling
• Subjects: Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games

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