How Borda voting rule can respect Arrow IIA and avoid Cloning manipulation

DOMBOU T., Dany R. (2017): How Borda voting rule can respect Arrow IIA and avoid Cloning manipulation. Published in: Journal of Economics Bibliography , Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2017): pp. 234-243.

Abstract

This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the problem of cloning manipulation. This new Borda voting specification will be named: Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV) and it satisfies Arrow's IIA condition. The calculations, propositions with proof and explanations are made to show the effectiveness of this method. From DBV, the paper presents a method to measure and quantify the magnitude of the shock due to change in irrelevant alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Voting rules; Arrow IIA; Cloning manipulation
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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