Balanced per capita contributions and levels structure of cooperation

Gómez-Rúa, María and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2008): Balanced per capita contributions and levels structure of cooperation.

Abstract

We define a new value for games with levels structure. We introduce a new property in this class of games, balanced per capita contributions, which is related with others in the literature. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this value using this new property.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: levels structure; value; balanced per capita contributions
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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