Matrix representation of TU-games for Linear Efficient and Symmetric values

Maimo, Clovis Wendji (2017): Matrix representation of TU-games for Linear Efficient and Symmetric values.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present a new tool for assessing TU-game based on a matrix representation. We focus on TU-games with coalition structures and provide a general matrix form of TU-game. We shed light on some useful properties of the matrix representation of TU-game and the general form obtained is applied to describe the representation for some classical TU-game. The facilities provided by such a representation are used to characterize subclasses of Linear Efficient and Symmetric (LES) values.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cooperative games ; Matrix ; LES value
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C69 - Other; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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