Public choice and political science: A view from Europe

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2018): Public choice and political science: A view from Europe.

Abstract

Abstract. What is the status of rational choice theory in contemporary European political science? Compared with a quarter-century ago, the rational choice approach is still far from being the paradigm of work in the discipline, but looking at both anecdotal evidence and information derived from journal citations and textbook contents, it seems that the number of political scientists working wholly or partly within the public choice approach has grown markedly, and that its contribution to the mainstream of the field is strong.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Keywords: Public choice; political science; comparative politics; history of thought; paradigms.
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925 > B10 - General; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B29 - Other; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods

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