Governance, social infrastructure and productivity

del Río, Fernando (2018): Governance, social infrastructure and productivity.

Abstract

I develop a neoclassical growth model in which the government accumulates contestable social infrastructure. In this framework, both a more accountable and more fairness governance encourages governmental accumulation of social infrastructure which fosters productivity. According to the calibrated model, for a country in the lower decile of the distribution of the index of social infrastructure, improving governance fairness by one standard deviation increases, on average, social infrastructure by 84% and GDP per worker by around 38%. However, the quantitative impact of improving governance accountability on social infrastructure and productivity is negligible.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Governance, productivity, rent-seeking, social infrastructure.
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O10 - General; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth ; Aggregate Productivity ; Cross-Country Output Convergence

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