Is Segregation Robust?

Bøg, Martin (2007): Is Segregation Robust?

Abstract

This paper studies the question of how well we understand segregation. The point of departure is Schelling’s spatial proximity model in one dimension. By introducing noise I show that segregation emerges as the long run prediction of neighborhood evolution, both when residents have Schelling-type threshold preferences and strict preferences for diversity. Analytical result are complemented with numerical simulations which show that within a reasonable time frame full segregation does not occur. When residents have a preference for diversity, I show that a natural perturbation away from the diversity monomorphism dramatically alters the long run prediction: integration is the unique long run prediction, even in the absence of noise.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: segregation; Markov Process; Stochastic Stability; simulations
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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