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Inventory Holding and a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Joint-Stock Firm

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2018): Inventory Holding and a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Joint-Stock Firm.

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Abstract

This paper investigates a mixed duopoly model in which there is a state-owned firm competing with a foreign joint-stock firm. The following situation is considered. In the first period, each firm non-cooperatively decides how many it sells in the current market. In addition, each firm can hold inventory for the second-period market. By holding large inventory, a firm may be able to commit to large sales in the next period. In the second period, each firm non-cooperatively chooses its second-period output. At the end of the second period, each firm sells its first-period inventory and its second-period output and holds no inventory. The paper traces out the firms’ reaction functions in the mixed duopoly model.

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