Excess burden of taxation and environmental policy mix with a consumer-friendly firm

Leal, Mariel and Garcia, Arturo and Lee, Sang-Ho (2018): Excess burden of taxation and environmental policy mix with a consumer-friendly firm.

Abstract

This study examines environmental policy mix of tradable emission permits and emission taxes in a duopoly model with a consumer-friendly firm. In the presence of excess burden of taxation, we analyze the interplay of the two policies in the non-equivalent conditions for welfare consequences. We show that emission tax can be redundant and thus policy mix is degenerated when both the excess burden of taxation and the degree of consumer-friendliness are insignificant. However, when the excess burden of taxation is significant, tradable permits policy with tax treatment should be accompanied to enhance welfare in the presence of a consumer-friendly firm. Finally, under the tax revenue-neutral case where the excess burden of taxation does not matter, environmental policy mix is also efficient if the degree of consumer-friendliness is sufficiently high.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: consumer-friendly firm; environmental policy mix; excess burden of taxation; tradable emission permits; emission tax
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L31 - Nonprofit Institutions ; NGOs ; Social Entrepreneurship; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics

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