Bargaining order in multilateral bargaining with imperfect compliments

Maurya, Amit Kumar (2018): Bargaining order in multilateral bargaining with imperfect compliments.

Abstract

Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are selling objects which are imperfect compliments for the buyer, we analyse buyer’s preferred bargaining order i.e. whether the buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first or second. For a narrow range of parameters, where players are patient enough and objects exhibit high degree of complimentarity, multiple equilibria exist such that both the bargaining orders are preferred. For rest of the range, which is relatively much larger, buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Key words: Multilateral bargaining; Bargaining order; Imperfect compliments
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory

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