McCarthy, David and Mikkola, Kalle and Thomas, Teruji (2016): Utilitarianism with and without expected utility.
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Abstract
We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons are encoded in a single `individual preorder'. The individual preorder then uniquely determines a social preorder. The social preorders described by these theorems have features that may be considered characteristic of Harsanyi-style utilitarianism, such as indifference to ex ante and ex post equality. However, the theorems are also consistent with the rejection of all of the expected utility axioms, completeness, continuity, and independence, at both the individual and social levels. In that sense, expected utility is inessential to Harsanyi-style utilitarianism. In fact, the variable population theorem imposes only a mild constraint on the individual preorder, while the constant population theorem imposes no constraint at all. We then derive further results under the assumption of our basic axioms. First, the individual preorder satisfies the main expected utility axiom of strong independence if and only if the social preorder has a vector-valued expected total utility representation, covering Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem as a special case. Second, stronger utilitarian-friendly assumptions, like Pareto or strong separability, are essentially equivalent to strong independence. Third, if the individual preorder satisfies a `local expected utility' condition popular in non-expected utility theory, then the social preorder has a `local expected total utility' representation. Although our aggregation theorems are stated under conditions of risk, they are valid in more general frameworks for representing uncertainty or ambiguity.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Utilitarianism with and without expected utility |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Harsanyi, utilitarianism, expected and non-expected utility, incompleteness, uncertainty, variable populations. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D60 - General D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty |
Item ID: | 90125 |
Depositing User: | Dr David McCarthy |
Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2018 19:12 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 09:48 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/90125 |
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Utilitarianism with and without expected utility. (deposited 20 Jul 2016 07:53)
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Utilitarianism with and without expected utility. (deposited 23 May 2017 13:35)
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