Singh, Nirvikar (2019): Theories of Governance and Development: How Does India’s Experience Fit?
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Abstract
This paper takes on the apparent paradox of India’s combination of durable democracy, capable bureaucracy, but a deficient development trajectory. It begins by outlining the nature of the problem. Then it summarizes and compares some significant approaches to drawing connections from governance institutions to development outcomes. Next, it reviews some of the contributions to understanding India’s political economy in the last few decades. Finally, it attempts to draw some lessons from India’s experience for the application of different theories of governance and development. The central lesson is that the paradox recedes when attention is paid to the subnational level, where India’s states encompass considerable variation in initial societal and economic conditions and in development outcomes.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Theories of Governance and Development: How Does India’s Experience Fit? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | democracy, embedded autonomy, governance, limited access orders, India, inclusive institutions, political economy |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O10 - General O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries P - Economic Systems > P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies > P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights |
Item ID: | 91049 |
Depositing User: | Nirvikar Singh |
Date Deposited: | 02 Jan 2019 12:43 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 15:19 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/91049 |