Načasovanie diskrétnej voľby v teórii investovania

Lojschova, Adriana (2001): Načasovanie diskrétnej voľby v teórii investovania.

Abstract

Many economic studies address the issue of behavior of a single representative agent or a firm. Therefore, it is important to study what happens if we aggregate the agents/firms, do they keep the same behavior patterns? The aim of this study is to construct a macroeconomic model that deals with the implementation of decisions in the theory of investment. Our focus is mainly on the timing of the economic activities of agents (we are looking at both economic entities: households-consumers and business-entrepreneurs). In particular, we investigate when is the best time to implement innovations, i.e. either to introduce them immediately or delay them.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Timing of the Discrete Choices in Investment Theory
• Language: Slovak
• Keywords: investment theory
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E32 - Business Fluctuations ; Cycles

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