Harsanyi support levels payoffs and weighted Shapley support levels values

Besner, Manfred (2018): Harsanyi support levels payoffs and weighted Shapley support levels values.

Abstract

This paper introduces a new class of values for level structures. The new values, called Harsanyi support levels payoffs, extend the Harsanyi payoffs from the Harsanyi set to level structures and contain the Shapley levels value (Winter, 1989) as a special case. We also look at extensions of the weighted Shapley values to level structures. These values, we call them weighted Shapley support levels values, constitute a subset of the class of Harsanyi support levels payoffs and coincide on a level structure with only two levels with a class of weighted coalition structure values, already mentioned in Levy and McLean (1989) and discussed in McLean (1991). Axiomatizations of the studied classes are provided for both exogenously and endogenously given weights.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cooperative game · Level structure · (Weighted) Shapley (levels) value · Level sharing system · Harsanyi set · Dividends
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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