Economics of Voluntary Information Sharing

Liberti, Jose and Sturgess, Jason and Sutherland, Andrew (2018): Economics of Voluntary Information Sharing.

Abstract

We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in existing markets, consistent with lenders trading off new market entry against heightened competition. We exploit shocks to information coverage to show that lenders enter new markets after joining the bureau in a pattern consistent with this trade-off. Our results illuminate why intermediaries voluntarily share information and show how financial technology that mitigates information asymmetries can shape the boundaries of lending.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: information sharing, adverse selection, specialization, financial intermediation, collateral, credit bureaus, fintech
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions ; Financial Instruments ; Institutional Investors; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill

References

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