Schiliro, Daniele (2017): Governance and institutions for stability and growth in the Eurozone.
PDF
MPRA_paper_95428.pdf Download (495kB) |
Abstract
The present paper aims to contribute to the debate on what kind of governance and institutions are needed to ensure stability and growth in the Eurozone. In fact, despite the economic recovery, the Eurozone does not yet have effective institutions to ensure stability in the face of a new economic crisis, without forgetting legitimacy, transparency, and ability to meet the expectations of greater prosperity for euro area citizens. This paper intends to support the view of a deep rethinking of EMU with a different governance and different institutions. The new governance should imply a renewed political agreement among the member states not only of the Eurozone, but also of the whole European Union. This political agreement must lead to a reconsideration of the Maastricht parameters, to a different approach of the European institutions and, lastly, to the change of the EU Treaty. The paper will also discuss the role of institutions that must balance the European interests and those of member states with the aim to provide a consistent approach to stability and growth.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Governance and institutions for stability and growth in the Eurozone |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | European Commission; ECB; rules-based system; economic convergence; banking union; financial stability; growth-oriented policies; transparency; legitimacy; treaty changes |
Subjects: | E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E60 - General F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F55 - International Institutional Arrangements O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth |
Item ID: | 95428 |
Depositing User: | Daniele Schilirò |
Date Deposited: | 05 Aug 2019 07:57 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 03:20 |
References: | Alcidi, C., Giovannini, A., & Piedrafita, S. (2014). Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU Governance. CEPS Special Report 98. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Alcidi, C., & Gros, D. (2015). EMU governance and the limits of fiscal policy coordination. In A. P. Kyriacou (ed.), Redesigning European Monetary Union Governance in Light of the Eurozone Crisis (pp. 47-56). Barcelona: CIDOB, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Baldwin, R., & Giavazzi, F. (eds.) (2015). The Eurozone Crisis. A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Remedies. VoxEU.org eBook, London: CEPR Press. Bayoumi, T., & Eichengreen, B. (1993). Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification’ In F. Torres, & F. Giavazzi (eds.), Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union (pp.193-229). New York: Cambridge University Press. Chang, M. (2016). The (ever) incomplete story of Economic and Monetary Union. Journal of Contemporary Economic Research, 12 (1): 487-501. Dabrowsky, M. (2015). Monetary union and fiscal and macroeconomic governance. European Economy Discussion Papers, 13: 1 – 44, September. De Grauwe, P. (1992). The Economics of Monetary Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Grauwe, P. (2013). The political economy of the Euro. Annual Review of Political Science, 16: 153-170. De Witte, B. (2012). Treaty games - Law as instrument and as constraint in the Euro crisis policy. In F. Allen, E. Carletti, & S. Simonelli (eds.), Governance for the Eurozone: integration or disintegration? Philadelphia, PA: FIC Press - Wharton Financial Institutions Center. Eichengreen, B., & von Hagen, J. (1996). Federalism, fiscal restraints, and European monetary union. American Economic Review, 86: 134-138, May. Eichengreen, B., Wyplosz, C. 2016. Minimal Conditions for the Survival of the Euro. Intereconomics, 1: 24-28. European Commission, (2010). Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination. Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 250 final. Brussels, 12.5.2010. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/documents/2010-05-12-com(2010)250_final.pdf European Commission, (2011). EU Economic governance “Six-Pack” enters into force. MEMO/11/898. Brussels, 12.12.2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-898_en.htm European Commission, (2017a). White Paper on the Future of Europe. Brussels, 1.3.2017. European Commission, (2017b). Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union. Brussels, 31.5.2017. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf Eyraud, L., Poghosyan, T., & Gaspar, V. 2017. Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area. IMF Working Paper 17/18. http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/01/30/Fiscal-Politics-in-the-Euro-Area-44601 Gros, D., & Busse, M. (2013). The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and Germany: When is a current account surplus an ‘imbalance’? CEPS Policy Briefs. Hertie School of Governance, (2015). The Governance Report 2015. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaldor, N. 1978. The Dynamic Effects of The Common Market. In N. Kaldor, Further Essays on Applied Economics (pp.187-220). London: Duckworth. MacDougall, D. (1977). The MacDougall Report — Volume I. Study group on the role of public finance in European integration. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, April. Obstfeld, M. (2013). Finance at a centre stage: Some lessons for the Euro-Crisis. European Economy, Economic Papers 493, April. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2013/pdf/ecp493_en.pdf Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2004). The Euro and Its Central Bank: Getting United After the Union. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pâris, P., & Wyplosz, C. (2014). PADRE 2.0, Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone. Technical report, The Graduate Institute, Geneva. Pisani-Ferry, J. (2012). The Euro crisis and the new impossible trinity. Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2012/01. Posen, A.S., & Ubide, A. (eds.) (2014). Rebuilding Europe’s common future. PIIE Briefing No. 14-5, December. Quadrio Curzio, A. (2011). On the Different Types of Eurobonds. Economia Politica, XXVIII (3): 279-293. Rodrigues, M.J. (2014). The Eurozone crisis and the transformation of EU economic governance. In M.J. Rodrigues & E. Xiarchogiannopoulou, The Eurozone crisis and the transformation of EU Governance. Internal and external implications (pp. 173-189). Farnham: Ashgate. Sanchis i Marco, M. (2014). The Economics of the Monetary Union and the Eurozone Crisis. New York: Springer. Schilirò, D. (2013). A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework. In M.C. Malaguti, B. Bossone, S. Cafaro, & S. Di Benedetto (eds.), Legitimacy and Efficiency in Global Economic Governance. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholar Publishing. Schilirò, D. (2014). Changes in Eurozone Governance after the Crisis and the Issue of Growth. International Journal of Social Science Studies, 2 (2): 110-119. Schilirò, D. (2017). Rules, Imbalances and Growth in the Eurozone. In R. Mirdala, & R.R. Canale (eds.) Economic Imbalances and Institutional Changes to the Euro and the European Union (International Finance Review, Volume 18) (pp.65-89). Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited. Schmidt, V. (2015). Changing the policies, politics, and processes of the Eurozone in crisis: will this time be different? In D. Natali, & B. Vanhercke (eds.), Social Developments in EU 2015, Brussels: European Social Observatory (OSE) and European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). Schmidt, V. (2016). The new EU governance: new intergovernmentalism, new supranationalism, and new parliamentarism. IAI working papers 16/11, May. Schoenmaker, D. (2015). Firmer foundation for a stronger European Banking Union. Bruegel working paper No. 2015/13. Tonveronachi, M. (2014). The ECB and the single European financial market: a proposal to repair half of the flawed design. Public Policy Brief, 137, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Van Rompuy, H. (2017). Europe means more than just crisis. Economia Politica, 34 (1): 1-10. Véron, N. (2015). Europe’s radical Banking Union, Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series, Brussels: Bruegel Véron, N., & Wolff, G.B. (2015). Capital Markets Union: a vision for the long term, Bruegel Policy Contribution, No. 2015/05. Zuleeg, F. (2015). Can the Eurozone’s economic governance combine political accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness? In A. P. Kyriacou (ed.), Redesigning European Monetary Union governance in light of the Eurozone crisis (pp.57-65). Barcelona: CIDOB, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/95428 |