Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision

Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2020): Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision.

Abstract

In this paper, we consider college admissions with early decision using a many-to-one matching model with two periods. As in reality, each student commits to only one college in the early decision period and agrees to enroll if admitted. Under responsive and consistent preferences for both colleges and students, we show that there exists no stable matching system, consisting of early and regular decision matching rules, which is nonmanipulable via early decision quotas by colleges or early decision preferences by colleges or students.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: College admissions; early decision; manipulability; many-to-one matching.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory

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