De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2008): Bertrand-Edgeworth games under oligopoly with a complete characterization for the triopoly.
De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2009): Bertrand-Edgeworth games under oligopoly with a complete characterization for the triopoly.
Kurz, Heinz D. and Salvadori, Neri (2010): In Favor of Rigor and Relevance. A Reply to Mark Blaug.
Freni, Giuseppe and Gozzi, Fausto and Salvadori, Neri (2010): Existence of optimal strategies in linear multisector models with several consumption goods.
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2010): The classical notion of competition revisited.
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2010): The classical notion of competition revisited.
De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2010): Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly.
Salvadori, Neri (2010): Besicovitch, Sraffa, and the existence of the Standard commodity.
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2011): Competition.
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2012): Adam Smith on Monopoly Theory. Making good a lacuna.
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2013): The Malthus versus Ricardo 1815 Corn Laws Controversy: An appraisal.
De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2015): Bertrand-Edgeworth games under triopoly: the payoffs.
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2015): From endogenous growth to stationary state: The world economy in the mathematical formulation of the Ricardian system.
De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2016): Bertrand-Edgeworth games under triopoly: the equilibrium strategies when the payoffs of the two smallest firms are proportional to their capacities.
Freni, Giuseppe and Salvadori, Neri (2016): Ricardo on Machinery: A Textual Analysis.
Salvadori, Neri and De Francesco, Massimo A. (2020): Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly: Characterization of mixed strategy equilibria when some firms are large and the others are small.
De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2023): Bertrand-Edgeworth game under oligopoly. General results and comparisons with duopoly.
Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de
This repository has been built using EPrints software.
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by 
.
![[up]](/style/images/multi_up.png)
Up a level