Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (2005): Learning in Bayesian Regulation.
Download (235kB) | Preview
We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more information about his private type. Moreover, the outcome of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the agent is path-dependent; i.e. the convergence of the regulator's belief to the truth does not always yield the complete information outcome.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Learning in Bayesian Regulation|
|Keywords:||Learning; Principle-Agent Model; Bayesian Regulation; Incomplete Information Learning|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
|Depositing User:||Ismail Saglam|
|Date Deposited:||25. Feb 2007|
|Last Modified:||06. Jul 2015 08:26|
Available Versions of this Item
- Learning in Bayesian Regulation. (deposited 25. Feb 2007) [Currently Displayed]