Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (2005): Learning in Bayesian Regulation. Unpublished.
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We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more information about his private type. Moreover, the outcome of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the agent is path-dependent; i.e. the convergence of the regulator's belief to the truth does not always yield the complete information outcome.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Institution: | Bogazici University |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Learning; Principle-Agent Model; Bayesian Regulation; Incomplete Information Learning |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| ID Code: | 1899 |
| Deposited By: | Ismail Saglam |
| Deposited On: | 25. Feb 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 28. Jul 2011 15:57 |
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