Brams, Steven J. and Kilgour, D. Marc (2011): When does approval voting make the "right choices"?

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Abstract
We assume that a voter’s judgment about a proposal depends on (i) the proposal’s probability of being right (or good or just) and (ii) the voter’s probability of making a correct judgment about its rightness (or wrongness). Initially, the state of a proposal (right or wrong), and the correctness of a voter’s judgment about it, are assumed to be independent. If the average probability that voters are correct in their judgments is greater than ½, then the proposal with the greatest probability of being right will, in expectation, receive the greatest number of approval votes. This result holds, as well, when the voters’ probabilities of being correct depend on the state of the proposal; when the average probability that voters judge a proposal correctly is functionally related to the probability that it is right, provided that the function satisfies certain conditions; and when all voters follow a leader with an aboveaverage probability of correctly judging proposals. However, it is possible that voters may more frequently select the proposal with the greatest probability of being right by reporting their independent judgments—as assumed by the Condorcet Jury Theorem—rather than by following any leader. Applications of these results to different kinds of voting situations are discussed.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  When does approval voting make the "right choices"? 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Approval voting; election systems; referendums; Condorcet jury theorem 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6  Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61  Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D72  Political Processes: RentSeeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  34262 
Depositing User:  Steven J. Brams 
Date Deposited:  22. Oct 2011 15:46 
Last Modified:  16. Feb 2013 05:25 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/34262 