Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Choosing Electoral Rules in the Presence of Corruption

Tavares, Samia (2007): Choosing Electoral Rules in the Presence of Corruption.

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Abstract

Corruption is a problem that has been shown to adversely affect a country’s development. Recent studies have shown that a country’s electoral system can affect its corruption level. But if that is the case, then electoral rules could be chosen to maximize opportunities for corruption. This paper uses the recent wave of democratization and the resulting writing of new constitutions, which entailed in many cases the adoption of a new electoral system, to analyze the choice of electoral rules. Results suggest that more corrupt countries are more likely to adopt a plurality system than less corrupt ones.

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