Tavares, Samia (2007): Choosing Electoral Rules in the Presence of Corruption.
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Corruption is a problem that has been shown to adversely affect a country’s development. Recent studies have shown that a country’s electoral system can affect its corruption level. But if that is the case, then electoral rules could be chosen to maximize opportunities for corruption. This paper uses the recent wave of democratization and the resulting writing of new constitutions, which entailed in many cases the adoption of a new electoral system, to analyze the choice of electoral rules. Results suggest that more corrupt countries are more likely to adopt a plurality system than less corrupt ones.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||Rochester Institute of Technology|
|Original Title:||Choosing Electoral Rules in the Presence of Corruption|
|Keywords:||corruption; electoral system; government; democracy|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
|Depositing User:||Samia Costa Tavares|
|Date Deposited:||14. Jun 2007|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 03:50|