Dur, Umut (2012): A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem.
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Abstract This paper characterizes the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem. Schools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. For each school a strict priority ordering of students is determined by the school district. Each student has strict preference over the schools. We first define weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the unique Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies the weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. To our knowledge this is the first axiomatic approach to the top trading cycles mechanism in the school choice problem where schools have a capacity greater than one.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem|
|Keywords:||Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, School Choice Problem|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Insititutions > I20 - General
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
|Depositing User:||Umut Dur|
|Date Deposited:||16. Sep 2012 08:57|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 04:52|
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