Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2013): Entrepreneurs’ education and different variable pay schemes in Italian firms.
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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the influence of the education of entrepreneurs, which we hypothesise to be a signal of talent, on the adoption of variable pay (VP) schemes in the Italian economy. We estimate to what extent differences in the diffusion of VP between Italian firms reflect differences in the quality of entrepreneurs. Our estimates, which we obtained by taking both endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity into account, validate hypotheses about the direct positive effects of entrepreneurs’ education on the adoption of VP schemes. Furthermore, we ascertain the role of entrepreneurs’ education by examining its influence on the choice between different types of VP bonuses at the individual, group, or establishment levels. Our results suggest that highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to use individual or collective forms of VP schemes at the establishment level rather than team VP incentives.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Entrepreneurs’ education and different variable pay schemes in Italian firms |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Variable pay, education |
Subjects: | J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J50 - General |
Item ID: | 46163 |
Depositing User: | Mirella/M. Damiani |
Date Deposited: | 14 Apr 2013 07:40 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 08:18 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/46163 |