Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization

Mandal, Pinaki and Roy, Souvik (2020): Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_104044.pdf

Download (598kB) | Preview

Abstract

We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, non-bossy, and implementable in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP-implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (2019) provides a characterization of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.