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Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization

Mandal, Pinaki and Roy, Souvik (2021): Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization.

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Abstract

We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, non-bossy, and implementable in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP-implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (2019) provides a characterization of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.

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