A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategy-proof Rules

Roy, Souvik and Sadhukhan, Soumyarup (2017): A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategy-proof Rules. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Theory : pp. 1-38.

Abstract

We show that a large class of restricted domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, single-dipped, tree-single-peaked with top-set along a path, Euclidean, multi-peaked, intermediate (Grandmont (1978)), etc., can be characterized by using betweenness property, and we present a unified characterization of unanimous and strategy-proof random rules on these domains. As corollaries of our result, we show that all the domains we consider in this paper satisfy tops-onlyness and deterministic extreme point property. Finally, we consider weak preferences and provide a class of unanimous and strategy-proof random rules on those domains.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Betweenness propertyGeneralized intermediate domainsRandom social choice functionsStrategy-proofnessTops-restricted random min-max rules
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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