Roy, Souvik and Sadhukhan, Soumyarup (2017): A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategyproof Rules. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Theory : pp. 138.
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Abstract
We show that a large class of restricted domains such as singlepeaked, singlecrossing, singledipped, treesinglepeaked with topset along a path, Euclidean, multipeaked, intermediate (Grandmont (1978)), etc., can be characterized by using betweenness property, and we present a unified characterization of unanimous and strategyproof random rules on these domains. As corollaries of our result, we show that all the domains we consider in this paper satisfy topsonlyness and deterministic extreme point property. Finally, we consider weak preferences and provide a class of unanimous and strategyproof random rules on those domains.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategyproof Rules 
English Title:  A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategyproof Rules 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Betweenness propertyGeneralized intermediate domainsRandom social choice functionsStrategyproofnessTopsrestricted random minmax rules 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82  Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design 
Item ID:  104406 
Depositing User:  Mr. Soumyarup Sadhukhan 
Date Deposited:  07 Dec 2020 09:39 
Last Modified:  07 Dec 2020 09:39 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/104406 
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A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategyproof Rules. (deposited 25 May 2017 07:50)
 A Unified Characterization of Randomized Strategyproof Rules. (deposited 07 Dec 2020 09:39) [Currently Displayed]