عرضه، تقاضا، و پیشنهاد قیمت در بازار برق ایران

Ghaninejad, Mousa (2020): عرضه، تقاضا، و پیشنهاد قیمت در بازار برق ایران.

Abstract

English Abstract: In this paper, I review the supply and demand side of the electricity market in Iran. I review the potential bidding strategies that are in place in this market. I evaluate the optimality of bidding and introduce a new bidding strategy that could raise the profits of the firms. In the market of this study, firms are allowed to bid step-wise and are constrained to bid ten steps per bid. The market dispatcher estimates the market demand and based on the cumulated supply functions clears the market at one specific price. Those steps that are below the market clearing price will be allowed to produce and sell in the market. I argue that a continuous supply function is optimal in this setting and it is at the profit of the firms to use a supply function as close to a continuous supply as possible, i.e. using all ten steps.

Persian Abstract: این مقاله به بررسی عرضه و تقاضا در بازار برق ایران می‌پردازد. ابتدا ساختارهای پیشنهاد قیمت در بازار برق ایران بررسی می‌شود. سپس، بهینگی هر کدام از این ساختارهای پیشنهاد قیمت و ارتباط آن با بازار برق در ایران بررسی می‌شود. در بازار مورد مطالعه، هر تولیدکننده می‌تواند تا ده پله پیشنهاد قیمت بدهد. شرکت برق سپس با تحمین تقاضا و جمع عرضه‌ها در بازار قیمت نهایی را اعلام می‌کند. پله‌هایی که پایین‌تر از قیمت نهایی باشد اجازه‌ی تولید خواهند داشت. من در این مقاله به طور نظری اثبات می‌کنم که استفاده از هر ده پله برای تولیدکننده بهینه است. بنابراین، جهت بیشینه کردن سود، هر تولیدکننده باید تا حد ممکن شبیه تابعی پیشنهاد قیمت بدهد که پیوسته باشد.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Supply, Demand, and Bidding in Iran’s Electricity Market
• Language: Persian
• Keywords: Bidding; Electricity Market; Day-ahead Market; Energy; Policy
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products; P - Economic Systems > P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies > P28 - Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment

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