Competition in Signaling

Vaccari, Federico (2021): Competition in Signaling.

Abstract

I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and opposed interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information that is transmitted in equilibrium and the language used by senders to convey such information. Fully revealing and pure strategy equilibria exist but are not plausible. I identify sufficient conditions under which equilibria always exist, are plausible, and essentially unique, and deliver a complete characterization of such equilibria. As an application, I study the informative value of different judicial procedures.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: signaling, multi-sender, competition, misreporting, communication
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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