Ma, Siyu and Sen, Debapriya and Tauman, Yair (2024): Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs. Forthcoming in: Economic Theory
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Abstract
We study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly where an outside innovator uses three part tariffs that are combinations of upfront fees, per unit royalties and ad valorem royalties. Under general demand, the maximum possible licensing revenue under three part tariffs can be always attained by a policy that uses at most two of the three components. For relatively significant innovations, there exists an optimal policy consisting of a per unit royalty and upfront fee and a continuum of other optimal policies that are three part tariffs whose all components are positive. Completely characterizing optimal policies under linear demand, we show that for oligopolies with four or more firms: (i) pure upfront fees are optimal for insignificant innovations; (ii) for intermediate and significant innovations: (a) there is a continuum of optimal policies which always includes a two part tariff with unit royalty and upfront fee and (b) a two part tariff with an ad valorem royalty and fee or a two part royalty can be optimal for some, but not all parametric configurations.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs |
English Title: | Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | patent licensing; per unit royalties; ad valorem royalties; three part tariffs; acceptability and feasibility constraints |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D45 - Rationing ; Licensing L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing |
Item ID: | 121216 |
Depositing User: | Debapriya Sen |
Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2024 06:58 |
Last Modified: | 22 Jun 2024 06:58 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/121216 |
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