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A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model

Steinbacher, Matej and Steinbacher, Matjaz and Steinbacher, Mitja (2009): A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model.

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Abstract

In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.

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