Información y persuasión en los mercados financieros

Estrada, Fernando (2010): Información y persuasión en los mercados financieros.

Abstract

This paper aims to defend the importance of the information and persuasion in financial markets. The conviction relates to the developments of Argumentation Theory (AT). Understand that economic agents react according to the information they have, and that beliefs play an important role because it motivates the decisions to be made in certain circumstances. This paper is the first part will be illustrated in a second installment to the study of specific cases.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Information and persuasion in financial markets
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: Economics of Networks, Neuroeconomics, Behavioral & Experimental Finance, Real Estate, Risk Management
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D84 - Expectations ; Speculations; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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