Polterovich, Victor (1971): A Model of Resource Redistribution. Published in: Matekon , Vol. 7, No. 3 (1971): pp. 245262.

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Abstract
Consider an economy with n resources (goods) and m agents, and let initial resource allocation be given. We ask if it is possible to build a mutually beneficial bargaining sequence that approaches an optimal resource allocation even though a) only k ≤ n agents participates at each step of the bargaining sequence, and b) they use only information about participants of the exchange. We answer this question using a new concept of quasi  summator functions. In particular, the answer is positive if k > n and all agent utility functions are concave.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A Model of Resource Redistribution 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  bargain (exchange); resource redistribution (reallocation); Khelli's Theorem; deadlock point; quasisummator function 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D5  General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D50  General D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83  Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness 
Item ID:  21721 
Depositing User:  Victor Polterovich 
Date Deposited:  08 Oct 2018 12:10 
Last Modified:  28 Sep 2019 22:59 
References:  О.V. Guseva, "Sequence of Exchanges in a Convex Programming Problem," Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody, 1968, Vol. IV, No. 3. B.N. Pshenichnyi, "Convex Programming in Normalized Space," Kibernetika, 1965, No. 5. L. Dantser, B. Griunbaum, and V. Kli, Khelli's Theorem, Moscow, "Mir" Publishing House, 1968. S. Karlin, Mathematical Methods in the Theory of Games, Programming, and Economics, Moscow, "Mir" Publishing House, 1964. О.V. Guseva, "The Sequence of Exchanges in a Convex Programming Problem," Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody, 1969, Vol. V, No. 6. 
URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/21721 