A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization

Zeng, Zhixiong (2010): A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization.

Abstract

Policy actions by the Federal Reserve during the recent financial crisis often involve recapitalization of banks. This paper offers a theory of the non-neutrality of money for policy actions taking the form of injecting capital into banks via nominal transfers, in an environment where banking frictions are present in the sense that there exists an agency cost problem between banks and their private-sector creditors. The analysis is conducted within a general equilibrium setting with two-sided financial contracting. We first show that even with perfect nominal flexibility, the recapitalization policy can have real effects on the economy. We then study the design of the optimal long-run recapitalization policy as well as the optimal short-run policy responses to banking riskiness shocks.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Banking frictions; two-sided debt contract; money neutrality; unconventional monetary policy; reaction function.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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