Piffaretti, Nadia F. (2010): From Rent-seeking to Profit-creation: Private Sector Development and Economic Turnaround in Fragile States.
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The paper suggests a framework for evaluating the relevance of strategies of private sector development in fostering sustained economic turnaround in fragile and post-conflict situations. It highlights how fragility, violence and conflict change economic structures, introducing distortions, trapping agents into “short-termism” and changing incentives toward rent-seeking, and explores strategies for supporting shifting economic systems from predation to production.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||From Rent-seeking to Profit-creation: Private Sector Development and Economic Turnaround in Fragile States|
|Keywords:||Fragile States, Economic Turnaround|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O40 - General
|Depositing User:||F Piffaretti|
|Date Deposited:||10. Nov 2010 01:09|
|Last Modified:||12. Mar 2015 15:17|
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