Trabelsi, Emna (2010): Central bank communication: fragmentation as an engine for limiting the publicity degree of information.
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In earlier theoretical framework, Morris and Shin (2002) highlight the potential dangers of transparency policy. In particular, public announcements may be detrimental to social welfare. Later, Morris and Shin (2005) uphold that more precise communication can degrade the signal value of prices. Researchers suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) suggest rather limiting the publicity degree. We found that the same effect can be reached by establishing fragmented public information, but in presence of private signal.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Central bank communication: fragmentation as an engine for limiting the publicity degree of information|
|Keywords:||transparency ; central bank communication ; semi public information ; private information ; coordination|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
|Depositing User:||emna trabelsi|
|Date Deposited:||12. Nov 2010 13:47|
|Last Modified:||05. Jan 2016 14:30|
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