It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2010): It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations.

Abstract

We investigate the possible explanations of variations in aggregate levels of participation in large-scale political demonstrations. A simple public choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual May Day demonstrations of the Danish labour movement and socialist parties taking place in Copenhagen in the period 1980-2009. The most important explanatory variables are variations in the weather conditions. Political and socio-economic conditions exhibit few or no robust effects.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Collective action; demonstrations; free-riding; public choice; rationality
• Subjects: P - Economic Systems > P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions > P36 - Consumer Economics ; Health ; Education and Training ; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis

References

DeNardo, J. 1985. Powers in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins.

Finkel, S. E., Muller, E. N., & Opp, K.-D. 1989. 'Personal Influence, Collective Rationality and Mass Political Action', American Political Science Review 83(3), 885-903.

Goldstone, J. A. 1994. 'Is Revolution Individually Rational? Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action', Rationality and Society 6(1), 139-166.

Gomez, B. T., Hansford, T. G., & Krause, G. A. 2007. 'The Republicans Should Pray for Rain: Weather, Turnout, and Voting in US Presidential Elections', Journal of Politics 69(3), 649-663.

Granovetter, M. 1978. 'Treshold Models of Collective Behavior', American Journal of Sociology 83(6), 1420-1443.

Knack, S. 1994. 'Does Rain Help the Republicans? Theory and Evidence on Turnout and the Vote', Public Choice 79(1-2), 187-209.

Kuran, T. 1989. 'Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution', Public Choice 61(1), 41-74.

Kuran, T. 1991. 'The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising That We Were Surprised?', American Economic Review 81 (Papers and Procedings)(2), 121-125.

Kuran, T. 1995. Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. 1997. Rational Choice, Collective Action and the Paradox of Rebellion. Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen & Copenhagen Political Studies Press.

Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. 2004. 'The Paradox of Rebellion', in Rowley, C. K. & Schneider, F., eds., The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Lichbach, M. I. 1995. The Rebel's Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

LO. 2006. 1. Maj - Derfor, Landsorganisationen i Danmark (LO), København.

Matsusaka, J. G. & Palda, F. 1999. 'Voter Turnout: How Much Can We Explain?', Public Choice 98, 431-446.

Merrifield, J. 1993. 'The Institutional and Political Factors That Influence Voter Turnout', Public Choice 77(3), 657-667.

Mueller, D. C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oberschall, A. R. 1994. 'Rational Choice in Collective Protests', Rationality and Society 6(1), 79-100.

Olson, M. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 2. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Opp, K.-D. 1989. The Rationality of Political Protest: A Comparative Analysis of Rational Choice Theory. Boulder: Westview Press.

Opp, K.-D. 1991. 'Processes of Collective Political Action', Rationality and Society 3(2), 215-251.

Tullock, G. 1971. 'The Paradox of Revolution', Public Choice 11, 89-100.

Tullock, G. 1974. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg: Center for Study of Public Choice.

Wilke. 2009. 'Arbejdernes Internationale Kampdag Lever Endnu', Wilke Nyhedsbrev(maj).