Colignatus, Thomas (2007): In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections.
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Abstract
Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of runoff plurality Sarkozy got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences. The parliamentary vote that followed the presidential vote and that annihilated Bayrou increased the paradox but not the principles involved.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Institution:  Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics 
Original Title:  In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; runoff plurality; Borda Fixed Point; democracy 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations A  General Economics and Teaching > A2  Economic Education and Teaching of Economics H  Public Economics > H0  General 
Item ID:  3726 
Depositing User:  Thomas Colignatus 
Date Deposited:  27 Jun 2007 
Last Modified:  27 Sep 2019 16:54 
References:  Thomas Colignatus is the preferred name of Thomas Cool in science. EWP references are to the Economics Working Papers Archive at the Washington University at St. Louis: http://econwpa.wustl.edu. See also http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool. To enhance completeness, the following lists the literature in Colignatus (2007b) as well (which in itself need not be complete). Ancot & Hughes Hallet (1984), “Establishing public preferences for coalition government: an empirical study in economic planning behavior”, De Economist, p153170 Aronson, E. (1972, 1992a), “The social animal”, Freeman, sixth edition 1992 Aronson, E. (ed) (1973, 1992b), Readings about The Social Animal”, Freeman, sixth edition 1992 Arrow, K, & T. Scitovsky eds. (1969), “Readings in welfare economics”, Allen & Unwin Arrow, K. & F. Hahn (1971), “General competitive analysis”, North Holland Arrow, K. 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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/3726 
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In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections. (deposited 11 May 2007)
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