Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2012): Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective.
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Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scienti�c theories are auxiliary constructs re-describing people's behav- ioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as electrons and electromagnetic �elds. While behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains the dominant orthodoxy in economics, especially in the form of �revealed preference�theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common conceptual confusions about the two views in economics, (ii) situate the debate in a broader historical and philosophical context, and (iii) defend a mentalist approach to economics. Setting aside normative concerns about behaviourism, we show that mentalism is in line with best scienti�c practice even if economics is treated as a purely positive science of human social behaviour. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that social behaviour should be explained in terms of people's brain processes, as distinct from their mental states.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective|
|Keywords:||behaviourism, mentalism, realism, economic models, preferences, beliefs, rationalization, philosophy of science, neuroeconomics|
|Subjects:||B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B0 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General
A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General
N - Economic History > N0 - General
A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A14 - Sociology of Economics
B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B41 - Economic Methodology
|Depositing User:||Franz Dietrich|
|Date Deposited:||16. Apr 2012 12:50|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 23:23|
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