Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening

Barbos, Andrei (2012): Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening.

Abstract

This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who decides whether or not to accept it. First, we show that there exist instances where an agent with a better track record of producing high-quality projects should be subjected to more stringent standards. Second, we show that an increase in the submission fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Evaluation; Project Screening; Regulatory Burden
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L50 - General

References

Barbos, A., (2012) "Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation," working paper, University of South Florida.

Boleslavsky, R., Cotton, C., (2011) "Learning More by Doing Less," working paper, University of Miami.

Cotton, C., (2012) "On submission fees and response times in academic publishing," American Economic Review, forthcoming.

Leslie, D., (2005) "Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?," American Economic Review, 95 , 407--413.

Ottaviani, M., Wickelgren, A., (2009) "Approval Regulation and Learning, with Application to Timing of Merger Control," working paper, Northwestern University.

Taylor, C.R., Yildirim, H., (2011) "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," Review of Economic Studies, 78, 762-794.