Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2006): Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core.
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It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable simple games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core|
|Keywords:||Voting games; infinitely many players; recursion theory; Turingcomputability; computable manuals and contracts|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D90 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C69 - Other
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games
|Depositing User:||H. Reiju Mihara|
|Date Deposited:||13. Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||27. Feb 2013 18:07|
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Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core. (deposited 13. Oct 2006)
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core. (deposited 22. May 2007)