Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2007): Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core. Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics , Vol. 44, No. 34 (February 2008): pp. 348366.
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Abstract
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura's theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Voting games; infinitely many players; recursion theory; Turing computability; computable manuals and contracts 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71  Cooperative Games D  Microeconomics > D9  Intertemporal Choice > D90  General D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6  Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C69  Other 
Item ID:  6803 
Depositing User:  H. Reiju Mihara 
Date Deposited:  19. Jan 2008 14:48 
Last Modified:  10. Aug 2015 21:02 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/6803 
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