Koray, Semih and Saglam, Ismail (1997): Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets.
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Abstract
We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Institution: | Bilkent University |
| Original Title: | Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Bayesian Implementation; Nash Implementation; Asymmetric Information; Oligopoly; Regulation |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L50 - General |
| Item ID: | 4459 |
| Depositing User: | Ismail Saglam |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Aug 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2019 00:11 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/4459 |
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