Bimonte, Giovanna (2013): A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results.

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Abstract
It is well known that in a differential information economy the free coalition formation may imply some theoretical difficulties. It does not suffice to say that a coalition can be formed by several agents. We define a set of all possible coalitions as the set of those coalitions that can be formed and joint by any agent. There exists, in this way, a rule imposed over coalition formation. We assume that only a subset $\mathcal{S}$ of $\Sigma$ is alowed to form. In such way, we fix over the set of agents an aggregation rule for which the coalitions can be formed only if they belong to this subset. We have restricted the set of coalitions that can be joined by traders. The main result is the equivalence between two private core concept: the classical one for a differential information economy and the private core restricted.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Differential information economy, restriction on coalition formation, private core. 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D1  Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11  Consumer Economics: Theory D  Microeconomics > D5  General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51  Exchange and Production Economies D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82  Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design 
Item ID:  46283 
Depositing User:  Dr Giovanna Bimonte 
Date Deposited:  17 Apr 2013 17:10 
Last Modified:  28 Sep 2019 09:56 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/46283 