Libman, Alexander (2012): Перераспределительные конфликты и факторы культуры в новой политической экономии.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_48192.pdf Download (108kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This note reviews two possible approaches to political economics scholarship - one concentrating on redistribution conflicts under the assumption of homogenous preferences and one focusing on preference heterogeneity and, among other issues, cultural specificty of agents. It discusses both advantages and disadvantages of the approaches and the possible examples of their application
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Перераспределительные конфликты и факторы культуры в новой политической экономии |
English Title: | Redistributive Conflicts and Culture in the New Political Economy |
Language: | Russian |
Keywords: | culture; redistribution; political economics |
Subjects: | A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B41 - Economic Methodology D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making |
Item ID: | 48192 |
Depositing User: | Alexander Libman |
Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2013 11:29 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 18:20 |
References: | Gamble A. The New Political Economy. // Political Studies, 1995, Vol. 43, No. 3 Persson T., Roland G., Tabellini G. Towards Micropolitical Foundation of Public Finance // European Economic Review. 1998. Vol. 42. No. 3-5 Schneider G. Wer hat Angst vor John Nash? Zum Stellenwert des Rational Choice-Ansatzes in Deutschland und Frankreich. Mimeo, 2007 Stigler G.J., Becker G.S. De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. // American Economic Review. 1977. Vol. 67. No. 2 Jordahl H., Berggren N., Poutvaara P. The Looks of a Winner: Beauty and Electoral Success. // Journal of Public Economics. 2010. Vol. 94. No. 1-2 Jennings C. Rationalizing “Irrational” Support for Political Violence. Mimeo, 2011 Van Winden F. 2001. Emotional Hazard Exemplified by Taxation-Induced Anger. // Kyklos. 2001. Vol. 54. PP. 491-506 Van Winden F. Affective Public Choice, in J.C. Pardo and P. Schwartz, eds. Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy. Edward Elgar, 2007 Bossman R., van Winden F. Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment. // Economic Journal. 2002. Vol. 112. P. 147-169 Fearon J.D., Laitin D.D. Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity. // International Organization. 2000. Vol. 54. P. 845-77 Gordon C., Arian A. Threat and Decision-Making. // Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2001. Vol. 45. P. 196-215 Sambanis N. Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War. // Perspectives on Politics. 2004. Vol. 2. P. 259-79 Alm J., Torgler B. Cultural Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe. // Journal of Economic Psychology. 2006. Vol. 27. P. 224-246 Feld L.P., Frey B.S. Tax Compliance as a Result of Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation. // Law and Policy. 2007. Vol. 29. P.102-120 Gadarian S.K. The politics of threat: How terrorism news shapes foreign policy attitudes. // Journal of Politics. 2010. Vol. 72. P. 469-83 Maoz I., McAuley C. Threat, Dehumanization, and Support for Retaliatory Aggressive Policies in Asymmetric Conflict. // Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2008. Vol. 52. P. 93-116; Halperin E. Group-based Hatred in Intractable Conflict in Israel. // Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2008. Vol. 52. P. 713-36 Hug S., Sporri F. Referendums, Trust and Tax Evasion. // European Journal of Political Economy. 2011. Vol. 27. P.120-151 Konrad K., Qari S. The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? Patriotism and Tax Compliance. // Economica. 2012. Vol. 79. P. 516-533 Feld L.P., Larsen C. Self-Perception, Government Policies and Tax Compliance in Germany. // International Tax and Public Finance. 2012. Vol. 19. P. 78-103 van Winden F. Affective Social Ties – Missing Link in Governance Theory. // Rationality, Markets and Morals. 2012. Vol. 3. P. 108-122 McFadden D. The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence. // Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 7. No. 1 Berggren N. Time for Behavioral Political Economy? An Analysis of Articles in Behavioral Economics. // Review of Austrian Economics. 2012. Vol. 25. No. 3 Frey B.S. Tullock Challenges: Happiness, Revolutions and Democracy. CREMA Working Paper No. 12, 2011 Hamlin A., Jennings C. Expressive Political Behavior: Foundations, Scope and Implications. // British Journal of Political Science. 2011. Vol. 41. No. 1 Hillman A.L. Expressive Behavior in Economics and Politics. // European Journal of Political Economy. 2010. Vol. 26. No. 4 Bowles S. Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions. // Journal of Economic Literature. 1998. Vol. 36. No. 1 Mullainathan S., Washington E. Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes. // American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2009. Vol. 1. No. 1 Smith J. The Endogenous Nature of Social Preferences. Mimeo, 2009 Herrmann-Pillath C. What Have We Learnt from 20 Years of Economic Research Into Culture? // International Journal of Cultural Studies. 2010. Vol. 13. No. 4 North D.C. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005 Tabellini G. Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe. // Journal of the European Economic Association. 2010. Vol. 8. No. 4 Mayer C.S. In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 3-6 Jessop B., Oosterlynk S. Cultural Political Economy: On Making the Cultural Turn without Falling into Soft Economic Sociology. // Geoforum, 2008, Vol. 39, No. 3 Tsebelis G. Rational Choice and Culture. Mimeo, 1997 Mainwaring S., Perez-Linan A. Why Religions of the World Are Important: Regional Specificities and Region-Wide Diffusion of Democracy. Mimeo, 2005 Spenkuch J. The Protestant Ethic and Work: Micro-Evidence from Contemporary Germany. MPRA Working Paper No. 26444, 2009 Becker S.O., Woessmann L. Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History. // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2009. Vol. 124. No. 2 Blum U., Dudley L. Religion and Economic Growth: Was Weber Right? // Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 2001. Vol. 11. No. 2 Grier R. The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross National Study of 63 Former Colonies. // Kyklos. 1997. Vol. 50. No. 1 Becker S.O.. Woessmann L. The Effect of Protestantism on Education before the Industrialization: Evidence from 1816 Prussia. // Economics Letters. 2010. Vol. 107. No. 2 Renneboog L., Spaenjers C. Religion, Economic Attitude, and Household Finance // Oxford Economic Papers. 2012. Vol. 64. No. 1 Guiso L., Sapienza P., Zingales L. People’s Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes. // Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003. Vol. 50. No. 1 Barro J., McCleary R. Religion and Economic Growth. // American Sociological Review. 2003. Vol. 68. No. 5 Meyersson E. Religion, Politics and Development. Stockholm: SSE, 2010 Guiso L., Sapienza P., Zingales L. Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes? // Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2006. Vol. 20. No. 2 Noland M. Religion and Economic Performance. // World Development. 2005. Vol. 33. No. 8 Potrafke N. Islam and Democracy // Public Choice. 2012. Vol. 151. No. 1-2 Rowley C.K., Smith N. Islam’s Democratic Paradox: Muslims Claim to Like Democracy, So Why Do They Have So Little? // Public Choice. 2009. Vol. 139. No. 3-4 Maseland R., van Hoorn A. Why Muslims Like Democracy Yet Have So Little of It // Public Choice. 2011. Vol. 147. No. 3-4 Herrmann-Pillath C., Libman A., Yu X. Economic Integration in China: Politics versus Culture. Mimeo, 2012 |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/48192 |