Game theory on strategic communication: an approach from Thomas S. Schelling

Estrada, Fernando (2010): Game theory on strategic communication: an approach from Thomas S. Schelling. Published in: Revista Sociedad y Economía (2013): pp. 1-16.

Abstract

In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's originality is to extend economic theory to social sciences. When a player can anticipate the options and influence the decisions of others. The strategy, indirect communication plays a crucial role. To illustrate, we investigate how to perform the payoff matrix in cases of bribery and threat

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Social Science, Schelling, game theory, strategic communications, bribes, threats.
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B0 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B0 - General > B00 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D84 - Expectations ; Speculations; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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